Fourth Amendment Pragmatism by Solove, Daniel J.
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 
2010 
Fourth Amendment Pragmatism 
Daniel J. Solove 
George Washington University Law School, dsolove@law.gwu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B. C. L. Rev. 1511 (2010). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu. 
1511 
FOURTH AMENDMENT PRAGMATISM 
Daniel J. Solove* 
Abstract: This Essay argues that the Fourth Amendment reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy test should be abandoned. Instead of engaging in a 
fruitless game of determining whether privacy is invaded, the U.S. Su-
preme Court should adopt a more pragmatic approach to the Fourth 
Amendment and directly face the issue of how to regulate government in-
formation gathering. There are two central questions in Fourth Amend-
ment analysis: (1) the Coverage Question—does the Fourth Amendment 
provide protection against a particular form of government information 
gathering? and (2) the Procedure Question—how should the Fourth 
Amendment regulate this form of government information gathering? 
The Coverage Question should be easy to answer: the Fourth Amend-
ment should regulate whenever government information gathering cre-
ates problems of reasonable significance. Such a scope of coverage would 
be broad, and the attention wasted on the Coverage Question would be 
shifted to the Procedure Question. This pragmatic approach to the 
Fourth Amendment is consistent with its text and will make Fourth 
Amendment law coherent and comprehensive. 
Introduction 
 The reasonable expectation of privacy test currently governs the 
scope of Fourth Amendment protection. Ever since Katz v. United States 
was decided in 1967,1 the U.S. Supreme Court has determined the 
boundaries of Fourth Amendment protection against government in-
formation gathering by asking whether a person exhibits an “expecta-
tion of privacy” that society recognizes as “reasonable.”2 
 The reasonable expectation of privacy test has led to a contentious 
jurisprudence that is riddled with inconsistency and incoherence. De-
bates rage over whether particular government information gathering 
                                                                                                                      
* © 2010, Daniel J. Solove, Professor of Law, George Washington University Law 
School. I would like to thank Danielle Citron, Thomas Crocker, Deven Desai, Orin Kerr, 
Raymond Ku, Christopher Slobogin, Michael Sullivan, Brian Tamanaha, and Peter Winn 
for helpful comments on the manuscript. 
1 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
2 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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activities invade “privacy.”3 I have been a frequent participant in these 
discussions, often criticizing judicial decisions under the Fourth Amend- 
ment as lacking a progressive understanding of privacy in light of mod-
ern technology.4 
 What makes for a great intellectual game does not make for good 
law. Few commentators are particularly fond of Fourth Amendment 
law.5 U.S. Supreme Court decisions applying the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy test have been attacked as “unstable”6 and “illogical,”7 
and even as engendering “pandemonium.”8 As one commentator has 
aptly observed, “[M]ost commentators have recognized that regardless 
of the political palatability of recent decisions, [F]ourth [A]mendment 
doctrine is in a state of theoretical chaos . . . .”9 
 For a long time, I believed that with the appropriate understand-
ing of privacy—one that is well-adapted to modern technology, nimble 
and nuanced, forward-looking and sophisticated—Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence could be rehabilitated. I now realize I was wrong. 
                                                                                                                      
3 See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, The Fourth Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous Technology, 75 
Miss. L.J. 1, 71 (2005) (critiquing the Court’s conception of privacy as inadequate to deal 
with new technology); Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 65 Ind. L.J. 549, 554–55 (1990) (“[W]e should return to the privacy test intended by 
[Justices] Stewart and Harlan and to the underlying values that motivated it.”); Brian J. 
Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model of Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 Minn. L. 
Rev. 583, 642 (1989) (“[T]he Court’s current [F]ourth [A]mendment analysis is based on 
simplistic and logically incorrect theories of public exposure.”). 
4 Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Informa-
tion Age 199–200 (2004) [hereinafter Solove, The Digital Person]; Daniel J. Solove, 
Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1083, 1086–87 
(2002) (“[Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)] symbolizes the Court’s lack of re-
sponsiveness to new technology, unwarranted formalism in its constitutional interpretation, 
and failure to see the larger purposes of the Fourth Amendment.”); Daniel J. Solove, The First 
Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 112, 126 (2007) (“Due to changes in tech-
nology and the realities of modern life, much First Amendment activity now leaves digital 
fingerprints beyond private zones protected by the Fourth Amendment.”). 
5 See Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the ‘Legitimate Expectation of Privacy,’ 
34 Vand. L. Rev. 1289, 1321 (1981); Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws 
in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 119, 122 (2002); 
Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy”: An Emerging Tripartite 
Analysis, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1077, 1080 (1987). But see Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth 
Amendment Protection, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 503, 506–07 (2007) (“Scholars and students of 
Fourth Amendment law find the current approach frustrating because the courts routinely 
mix and match the four models. . . . But appearances can be deceiving. What at first looks 
like conceptual confusion turns out to be a much-needed range of approaches.”). 
6 Colb, supra note 5, at 122. 
7 Ashdown, supra note 5, at 1321. 
8 See Wilkins, supra note 5, at 1081. 
9 Donald R.C. Pongrace, Stereotypification of the Fourth Amendment’s Public/Private Distinc-
tion: An Opportunity for Clarity, 34 Am. U. L. Rev. 1191, 1208 (1985). 
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 The entire debate over reasonable expectations of privacy is futile, 
for it is not focused on the right question. The debate is reminiscent of 
the philosophical dispute over a squirrel that William James relates in 
his book, Pragmatism: 
The corpus of the dispute was a squirrel—a live squirrel sup-
posed to be clinging to one side of a tree-trunk; while over 
against the tree’s opposite side a human being was imagined 
to stand. This human witness tries to get sight of the squirrel 
by moving rapidly round the tree, but no matter how fast he 
goes, the squirrel moves as fast in the opposite direction, and 
always keeps the tree between himself and the man, so that 
never a glimpse of him is caught. The resultant metaphysical 
problem now is this: Does the man go round the squirrel or not? He 
goes round the tree, sure enough, and the squirrel is on the 
tree; but does he go round the squirrel?10 
James told the others that the debate was in vain—it all boiled down to 
what “going round” the squirrel meant.11 If “going round” meant pass-
ing the squirrel in all four directions, then the man went around the 
squirrel.12 But if going around meant being on all four sides of the 
squirrel, then “the man fails to go round him, for by the compensating 
movements the squirrel makes, he keeps his belly turned towards the 
man all the time, and his back turned away.”13 We should avoid getting 
bogged down in such fruitless debates, James explains, as it is more 
productive to focus on “practical consequences.”14 
 Just as the scholars futilely debated whether the man went around 
the squirrel, we too have often focused on the wrong question when 
considering Fourth Amendment protection—whether there is an inva-
sion of privacy. As a result, current Fourth Amendment coverage often 
bears little relation to the problems caused by government investigative 
activities. It also bears little relation to whether it is best to have judicial 
oversight of law enforcement activity, what that oversight should consist 
of, how much limitation we want to impose on various government in-
formation gathering activities, and how we should guard against abuses 
of power. 
                                                                                                                      
10 William James, Pragmatism 22 (Prometheus Books 1991) (1907). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 22–23. 
14 Id. at 23. 
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 In this Essay, I argue for a more pragmatic approach to the Fourth 
Amendment. There are two central questions in Fourth Amendment 
analysis: 
(1) Does the Fourth Amendment provide protection against a 
particular form of government information gathering? 
 
(2) How should the Fourth Amendment regulate this form of 
government information gathering? 
I will refer to Question 1 as the “Coverage Question” and Question 2 as 
the “Procedure Question.” 
 The Coverage Question has preoccupied Fourth Amendment law 
and has led to a complicated morass of doctrines and theories. We 
should sidestep the contentious debate about expectations of privacy— 
or about any other specific value as a trigger for Fourth Amendment 
protection. Instead, whenever a particular government information 
gathering activity creates problems of reasonable significance, the 
Fourth Amendment should require regulation and oversight. These 
problems not only involve invasion of privacy, but also chilling of free 
speech, free association, freedom of belief, and consumption of ideas. 
They can involve inadequately constrained government power, lack of 
accountability of law enforcement officials, and excessive police discre-
tion, among other things. The Fourth Amendment should provide cov-
erage whenever any of these problems might occur. 
 Such an approach would result in Fourth Amendment coverage 
that is comprehensive rather than haphazard. It would be consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment’s language, which speaks broadly in terms 
of “unreasonable searches.”15 The Coverage Question thus should be 
easy—the Fourth Amendment should provide protection whenever a 
problem of reasonable significance can be identified with a particular 
form of government information gathering. 
 The more difficult question is the Procedure Question, which in-
volves how the Fourth Amendment should regulate government activi-
ties. What kind of regulation would best limit the problems created by a 
particular government information gathering activity? What degree of 
oversight would be effective as well as practical? Too much time and 
energy is wasted on the Coverage Question; it should be redirected to 
the Procedure Question. 
                                                                                                                      
15 See U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
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 In an ideal world, government information gathering would be 
regulated by a comprehensive statutory regime. Courts would analyze 
whether the rules in this statutory regime met basic Fourth Amend-
ment principles rather than craft the rules themselves. A pronounce-
ment as short and vague as the Fourth Amendment best serves as a 
guidepost to evaluate rules, rather than as a source of those rules. 
 But a comprehensive statutory regime to regulate government in-
formation gathering does not yet exist. Statutes regulate government 
information gathering in isolated areas, but there is no all-inclusive re-
gime.16 For better or worse, the Fourth Amendment has been thrust 
into the role of the primary regulatory system of government informa-
tion gathering. Until there is a substitute, we should treat the Fourth 
Amendment as the regulatory system it has been tasked with being. If 
legislatures respond with rules of their own, courts should shift from 
crafting the rules to evaluating the rules made by legislatures. 
 In Part I of this Essay, I argue that we should not only jettison the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test, but also avoid focusing on any 
specific kind of problem as the trigger for Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. Instead, as I contend in Part II, the Fourth Amendment should 
regulate whenever government information gathering leads to any type 
of problem of reasonable significance. Rather than constricting the 
scope of Fourth Amendment protection in arbitrary and illogical ways, 
courts should directly address how to regulate government information 
gathering. Toward this end, I propose a way courts can better work with 
legislatures to develop a comprehensive and balanced regulatory system 
for government information gathering. The system would be primarily 
statutory, following the Constitution’s guiding principles. I conclude by 
justifying this approach and defending it against potential objections. 
I. The Fourth Amendment’s Limited Coverage 
A. A Regulatory System in One Sentence 
 Unlike other countries, which have a centralized police system 
regulated by statute, the United States has a decentralized system of law 
enforcement that is regulated primarily by the Constitution.17 The 
structure of our current regulatory regime for government information 
gathering is framed largely by the Fourth Amendment, a short pro-
nouncement that says: 
                                                                                                                      
16 See Solove, The Digital Person, supra note 4, at 202–10. 
17 See id. at 188. 
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no [w]arrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by [o]ath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.18 
 An elaborate regulatory system rests upon this one sentence. 
Throngs of judicial decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment have 
spawned an extensive body of rules that govern nearly all aspects of 
government law enforcement investigative activity, such as: engaging in 
audio and visual surveillance; searching homes, cars, bags, and com-
puters; and establishing checkpoints. 
 The Framers of the Constitution likely had no idea the Fourth 
Amendment would serve as the foundation for regulating our entire 
system of law enforcement. They thought the Constitution only applied 
to the federal government, which in 1789 played only a minimal role in 
law enforcement. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelli-
gence Agency, National Security Agency, and other federal agencies did 
not yet exist. State and local police were also very minimal, and they 
were not governed by the Fourth Amendment. 
 But in the centuries after 1789, the nature of the Constitution and 
of law enforcement changed dramatically. The number and size of po-
lice forces burgeoned. Nascent technologies gave the government 
greater power to gather citizens’ personal information. New federal 
government agencies were created to address crime and national secu-
rity issues. Because comprehensive statutory regulation of law enforce-
ment was lacking at all levels of government, something was needed to 
regulate what law enforcement officials could do. The U.S. Supreme 
Court filled the void by crafting an extensive regulatory system based 
on constitutional law, and the Fourth Amendment became the guiding 
set of rules for when and how the government could gather informa-
tion about individuals. 
 Today, when the Fourth Amendment applies to any particular gov-
ernment information gathering activity, it requires government searches 
and seizures to be “reasonable.”19 This has been interpreted to mean 
that government officials typically must obtain a warrant supported by 
probable cause.20 Such a process provides the judicial branch some 
                                                                                                                      
18 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
19 Solove, The Digital Person, supra note 4, at 189. 
20 Id. 
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oversight of law enforcement officials as warrants must be authorized by 
a judge before the government may engage in its search.21 The govern-
ment must prove that it has probable cause— “reasonably trustworthy 
information” that is sufficient to “warrant a man of reasonable caution 
in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed” or that 
evidence will be found in the place to be searched.22 When the govern-
ment fails to follow these procedures, the typical remedy is the “exclu-
sionary rule” under which the information gleaned from the illegal 
search is excluded from trial.23 
 Many government activities to acquire personal information are 
not covered by the Fourth Amendment.24 In this regulatory void, there 
is sometimes a statute that provides protection, but in many circum-
stances, there is no protection at all, and the government may act with-
out any oversight or limitation.25 Therefore, the threshold test to de-
termine whether the Fourth Amendment will regulate a particular 
government information gathering activity becomes crucial. 
B. The Rise of the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test 
 What test should be used to determine when the Fourth Amend-
ment will regulate a particular law enforcement activity? For well over a 
century, the U.S. Supreme Court has wrangled with this question. The 
Fourth Amendment uses the terms “searches” and “seizures,” but it 
does not define them. Moreover, the language of the Fourth Amend-
ment was written centuries ago, long before modern technology dra-
matically altered the ways the government can gather information. 
 The Court’s initial answer, formed in the late nineteenth century, 
was to focus on physical types of intrusions.26 The Fourth Amendment 
covered rummaging through people’s papers and invading their prop-
                                                                                                                      
21 Id. 
22 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949). 
23 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961) (“We hold that all evidence obtained by 
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissi-
ble in a state court.”). 
24 See Solove, The Digital Person, supra note 4, at 200–02 (describing how courts 
have found no reasonable expectation of privacy where the police viewed the interior of 
the defendant's greenhouse from a helicopter, where police officers searched garbage bags 
that the defendant left on the curb, or where information is known or exposed to third 
parties). 
25 See id. 
26 Id. at 196–97 (“[T]he Court viewed invasions of privacy as a type of physical incur-
sion.”). 
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erty.27 Such an approach made sense during this time, for these meth-
ods were the primary means by which government officials gathered 
information about people. 
 But technology changed everything. Developed in the late nine-
teenth century, telephone communication—and the ability to wiretap 
telephone conversations—posed new and challenging Fourth Amend-
ment questions. In 1928, in Olmstead v. United States, the U.S. Supreme 
Court addressed whether wiretapping would be covered by the Fourth 
Amendment or left unregulated.28 The Court concluded that the 
Fourth Amendment did not cover wiretapping because “[t]here was no 
entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.”29 
 Justice Louis Brandeis dissented. He argued that the Court’s 
threshold test for determining Fourth Amendment coverage was my-
opic and antiquated, and that the Fourth Amendment must have the 
“capacity of adaptation to a changing world.”30 A more flexible and 
evolving approach should be used because: 
Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have 
become available to the government. Discovery and invention 
have made it possible for the government, by means far more 
effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in 
court of what is whispered in the closet.31 
 It took nearly forty years for the Court to embrace Brandeis’s view. 
In 1967, the Court overruled Olmstead in Katz v. United States.32 Katz gave 
birth to the Court’s current approach to determining whether the 
Fourth Amendment applies—the reasonable expectation of privacy 
                                                                                                                      
27 Id. This was known as the “physical trespass doctrine.” See, e.g., Silverman v. United 
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511–12 (1961) (concluding that use of a “spike mike,” which pene-
trated into the wall of a person’s home, constituted a physical trespass and therefore trig-
gered Fourth Amendment protection); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 
(1942) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not cover a recording device that does 
not physically intrude upon one’s property). 
28 277 U.S. 438, 464–66 (1928). 
The United States takes no such care of telegraph or telephone messages as 
of mailed sealed letters. The Amendment does not forbid what was done 
here. There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was se-
cured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry of 
the houses or offices of the defendants. 
Id. 
29 Id. at 464. 
30 Id. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
31 Id. at 473. 
32 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
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test.33 The purported goal of the reasonable expectation of privacy test 
was to permit the Fourth Amendment to respond to changing technol-
ogy.34 As Professor Carol Steiker has observed, “Brandeis could have felt 
vindicated by the Court’s replacement of the trespass doctrine with one 
more oriented toward the right of ‘privacy.’”35 
 At first glance, the reasonable expectation of privacy test seems 
quite sensible. According to the Court, “[t]he overriding function of 
the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity 
against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”36 Protecting privacy gives 
the Amendment coherence and a central purpose. It provides guidance 
about which government information gathering activities should be 
regulated. It turns the Amendment away from outdated formalistic 
considerations, such as whether there was a physical trespass, and re-
focuses it on privacy, a central value for freedom and democracy. The 
reasonable expectation of privacy test also promises flexibility—it can 
evolve with society and remain connected to current social values. 
 But the test has failed to live up to aspirations. Subsequent to the 
test’s development, the Supreme Court adopted a conception of privacy 
that countless commentators have found to be overly narrow, incoher-
ent, short-sighted, deleterious to liberty, and totally out of touch with 
society.37 According to Professor Scott Sundby, “The Fourth Amend-
ment as a privacy-focused doctrine has not fared well with the changing 
times of an increasingly non-private world and a judicial reluctance to 
                                                                                                                      
33 Id. at 351–52 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own 
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to 
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally pro-
tected.” (citations omitted)). 
34 Id. 
35 Carol S. Steiker, Brandeis in Olmstead: “Our Government Is the Potent, the Omnipresent 
Teacher,” 79 Miss. L.J. 149, 162 (2009). 
36 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). 
37 See, e.g., Aya Gruber, Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails: Is That What Katz Is Made of?, 
41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 781, 790 (2008) (“[T]he spirit of Katz is a promise of freedom from 
unwarranted invasions of privacy in all areas we consider intimate. Unfortunately, the Katz 
revolution was not unequivocally liberal.”); Katz, supra note 3, at 554 (noting that the 
Court has applied the reasonable expectation of privacy “to reduce rather than enhance 
[F]ourth [A]mendment protections”); George C. Thomas III, Time Travel, Hovercrafts, and 
the Framers: James Madison Sees the Future and Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80 Notre Dame 
L. Rev. 1451, 1500 (2005) (“The ‘expectation of privacy’ notion is flawed to the core.”). 
But see Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test, 40 
McGeorge L. Rev. 1, 9 (2008) (arguing that the reasonable expectation of privacy test was 
a way for the Court to incorporate its previous test of physical trespass, which focused on 
property, within a new approach that was more expansive). 
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expand individual rights.”38 Professor Morgan Cloud observes that “it is 
fair to conclude that Katz is a failure, at least if its original purpose was to 
ensure that Fourth Amendment standards regulate the use of modern 
surveillance technologies.”39 
 For example, under the “third party doctrine,” the Court has held 
that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for the ever-growing 
amount of personal data maintained by third parties. In 1979, the Court 
concluded in Smith v. Maryland that the Fourth Amendment does not 
apply to a list of the telephone numbers a person dials.40 Because peo-
ple “know that they must convey numerical information to the phone 
company” and that the phone company records this information for 
billing purposes, people cannot “harbor any general expectation that 
the numbers they dial will remain secret.”41 In 1976, in United States v. 
Miller, the Court used similar reasoning to conclude there was no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in bank records.42 
 Beyond the third party doctrine, the Court has concluded that 
people lack a reasonable expectation of privacy when the police view 
their property from a helicopter,43 search through trash bags left out on 
the curb,44 use a dog to sniff luggage for illegal substances,45 and have 
an undercover informant secretly record and transmit conversations.46 
 I could go on, listing many more cases and doctrines that I and 
other commentators find troubling. I have critiqued the Court’s con-
ception of privacy as focusing too much on the secrecy of information 
                                                                                                                      
38 Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Gov-
ernment and Citizen?, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1751, 1771 (1994). 
39 Morgan Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the Constitution: The Supreme Court, Technology and 
the Fourth Amendment, 72 Miss. L.J. 5, 28–29 (2002); see also Katherine J. Strandburg, Free-
dom of Association in a Networked World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 
49 B.C. L. Rev. 741, 769–77 (2008) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment provides insuffi-
cient protection against government “relational surveillance” using traffic data). 
40 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979). 
41 Id. 
42 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). 
43 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–52 (1989) (“[Petitioner] could not reasonably 
have expected that his greenhouse was protected from public or official observation from 
a helicopter had it been flying within the navigable airspace for fixed-wing aircraft.”). 
44 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43–44 (1988) (“We have already concluded 
that society as a whole possesses no [reasonable expectation of privacy] with regard to 
garbage left for collection at the side of a public street.”). 
45 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (“[T]he use of a well-trained narcotics-
detection dog . . . during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate pri-
vacy interests.”). 
46 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1971) (concluding that an agent could 
record or transmit a conversation with the defendant without a warrant). 
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and failing to account for the fact that in today’s Information Age, so 
little of our data is secret.47 I long wanted the Court to recognize that it 
was wrong about privacy. I thought that if the Court were to conceptual-
ize privacy as I recommended, Fourth Amendment law would be revi-
talized. 
 I now have come to believe that the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy test cannot be resuscitated. The debate over what constitutes pri-
vacy is an important and interesting one—and certainly has relevance 
for the Fourth Amendment—but it is not the central determination 
that should trigger Fourth Amendment protection. 
C. Why the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test Is Doomed 
 The reasonable expectation of privacy test is not merely in need of 
repair—it is doomed. From the way it is formulated, the test purports to 
be an empirical metric of societal views on privacy. The Supreme Court, 
however, has never cited to empirical evidence to support its conclu-
sions about what expectations of privacy society deems to be reason-
able. As one commentator has stated: “How do we know what society is 
prepared to accept as reasonable? Because there is no straightforward 
answer to this question, ‘reasonable’ has largely come to mean what a 
majority of the Supreme Court Justices says is reasonable.”48 
 The Court itself has acknowledged that the test is not entirely em-
pirical.49 For example, in United States v. Jacobsen, the Court noted that 
“[t]he concept of an interest in privacy that society is prepared to rec-
ognize as reasonable is, by its very nature, critically different from the 
mere expectation, however well justified, that certain facts will not 
come to the attention of the authorities.”50 As Justice Scalia once stated, 
“In my view, the only thing the past three decades have established 
about the Katz test . . . is that, unsurprisingly, [reasonable expectations 
of privacy] bear an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of pri-
vacy that this Court considers reasonable.”51 
                                                                                                                      
47 Solove, The Digital Person, supra note 4, at 42–44. 
48 Robert M. Bloom, Searches, Seizures, and Warrants 46 (2003); see also Minne-
sota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
49 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 n.5 (“[W]here an individual’s subjective expectations had 
been ‘conditioned’ by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, 
those subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what 
the scope of Fourth Amendment protection was.”). 
50 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984). 
51 Carter, 525 U.S. at 97 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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 The Court rarely takes any steps to determine what society deems 
reasonable. Clearly, the justices have no special ability to sense the col-
lective desires and values of all citizens of the United States. They in-
stead are just stating their own preferences and opinions, whether they 
are consistent with society’s or not. 
 In many instances, what the Court considers to be an invasion of 
privacy bears no relationship to what people will say in surveys. Profes-
sors Christopher Slobogin and Joseph Schumacher conducted a survey 
to see if people’s expectations of privacy matched what the Court had 
determined.52 Their data revealed that “the Supreme Court’s conclu-
sions about the scope of the Fourth Amendment are often not in tune 
with commonly held attitudes about police investigative techniques.”53 
 Many commentators critique the Supreme Court for failing to look 
to the actual societal expectations of privacy.54 But there are good rea-
sons why the Court refuses to use empirical evidence to identify rea-
sonable expectations of privacy. Taking surveys—a predominant way to 
measure things empirically—raises several problems. First, various sub-
groups may differ in their attitudes about privacy. People’s attitudes 
about privacy diverge depending upon their race, ethnicity, or religion. 
The Bill of Rights has oft been championed as necessary to protect mi-
norities by limiting the will of the majority. Following surveys would 
make the Fourth Amendment too shackled to the preferences of the 
majority. Moreover, it would strike many as illegitimate because the 
Constitution is supposed to transcend the will of the majority at any 
particular moment in time. 
 Second, and most compellingly, surveys are deficient to measure 
reasonable expectations of privacy because people’s behavior often fails 
to match their stated preferences for privacy.55 Professors Alessandro 
Acquisti and Jens Grossklags observe that “recent surveys, anecdotal 
evidence, and experiments have highlighted an apparent dichotomy 
between privacy attitudes and actual behavior. . . . [I]ndividuals are will-
ing to trade privacy for convenience or to bargain the release of per-
sonal information in exchange for relatively small rewards.”56 It is easy 
                                                                                                                      
52 Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and 
Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and 
Permitted by Society,” 42 Duke L.J. 727, 732 (1993). 
53 Id. at 774. 
54 See, e.g., Bloom, supra note 48, at 46; Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 52, at 774. 
55 See Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality: A Survey, in Pri-
vacy and Technologies of Identity: A Cross-Disciplinary Conversation 15, 16 
(Katherine J. Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds., 2006). 
56 Id. 
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to state in a survey that one really values privacy, but what people truly 
value in practice is revealed by their behavior.57 
 Although behavioral data appears to be more accurate than sur-
veys, behavioral data also suffers from significant shortcomings in 
measuring people’s preferences. People often fail to understand the 
implications of their behavior on their privacy. Information is often 
gathered in pieces, here and there, and with each particular piece, a 
person might not perceive a substantial invasion. When the informa-
tion is combined, however, people may be surprised at how much about 
their personalities, interests, and intellectual pursuits is revealed. I have 
referred to this phenomenon as the “aggregation effect.”58 
 Both survey and behavioral data are also deficient because they 
often reflect what people think and do without full awareness of the 
consequences. Consider, for example, whether there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in trash. In 1998 in California v. Greenwood, the 
Supreme Court held that there was no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in garbage left in bags on the curb.59 In Professors Slobogin and 
Schumacher’s survey, people provided with examples of government 
searches rated a search of trash to be in the middle of the pack as to its 
intrusiveness.60 They rated a dog sniff of luggage to be more intrusive.61 
Their ratings might not have been the same, however, if more about 
the nature of the searches were pointed out to them. A dog sniff can 
divulge only limited information about the contents of one’s luggage, 
which often does not contain particularly revealing things. One’s trash, 
however, can contain very revealing information, such as personal writ-
ings and even genetic data from hair samples or the like. In further 
empirical research, Professor Slobogin notes that people rate searches 
of their credit card records, pharmacy records, and bank records as 
very intrusive.62 Yet all of this information is revealed in trash, where 
financial records and empty medication bottles are routinely discarded. 
People’s stated preferences and behavior might be quite different if 
these facts were brought to their attention. 
 Thus, it is very difficult to measure society’s expectations of privacy 
accurately. Even if a metric could be devised to present a precise pic-
                                                                                                                      
57 Id. 
58 Daniel J. Solove, Understanding Privacy 118–19 (2008). 
59 486 U.S. at 40. 
60 Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 52, at 739–41. 
61 Id. 
62 Christopher Slobogin, Privacy at Risk: The New Government Surveillance 
and the Fourth Amendment 184 (2007). 
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ture of what people expected to be private when fully informed, the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test would still be flawed for several 
reasons. First, technology would gradually erode what people expected 
to be private, and this erosion would allow the government to engage 
in ever more invasive searches. Second, expectations of privacy depend 
in part on the law, so judicial decisions about reasonable expectations 
of privacy would have a bootstrapping effect. If the Supreme Court said 
there was or was not a reasonable expectation of privacy in something, 
then that pronouncement would affect people’s future expectations.63 
Third, the government could condition the populace into expecting 
less privacy. For example, as Professor Anthony Amsterdam has ob-
served, the government could diminish expectations of privacy by an-
nouncing on television each night that we could all be subject to elec-
tronic surveillance.64 
 Looking at expectations is the wrong inquiry. The law should pro-
tect certain information regardless of whether people expect it to be 
private or not. What matters is what people desire. We look to the law 
not just to preserve the status quo, but to change it and to shape society 
into what we want it to be. 
 Consider people’s expectations in privacy of the mail. For much of 
history, people did not expect privacy in their letters.65 From colonial 
times, through the American Revolution and long into the nineteenth 
century, there was widespread fear that one’s letters were being illicitly 
opened by those who delivered them.66 Many laws were passed to but-
tress protection of the mail.67 People wanted their letters to be pro-
tected as private even when they were not particularly private. Accord-
ing to David Seipp, “[n]ineteenth century public opinion regarded the 
‘sanctity of the mails’ as absolute in the same way it esteemed the invio-
                                                                                                                      
63 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Constitutional Circularity, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 60–61 
(2001) (“Fourth Amendment doctrine . . . is circular, for someone can have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in an area if and only if the Court has held that a search in that area 
would be unreasonable.”); Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Su-
preme Court, 1979 Sup. Ct. Rev. 173, 188 (arguing that whether a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy is “circular” because “such an expectation will depend on what the 
legal rule is”); Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 Geo. L.J. 2087, 2094 (2001) 
(“[J]udicial interpretations of ‘reasonable expectations’ will affect the actions of law en-
forcement agencies, which in turn will affect the actual social norms that define privacy.”). 
64 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 
349, 384 (1974). 
65 Solove, The Digital Person, supra note 4, at 225. 
66 Id. 
67 See id. 
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lability of the home.”68 It was society’s desire that letters be private—not 
its expectation—that sparked the law to make it so. 
 But even measuring desires fails to address an overarching prob-
lem: we might want to regulate government information gathering 
even when it does not violate privacy. The problem with a doctrinal test 
based on privacy is that it ensnares courts and commentators into a de-
bate over the meaning of privacy and takes the focus away from the full 
range of problems the Fourth Amendment needs to address. Practical 
consequences are ignored in an analytic approach that is nearly blind 
to the results. 
 Imagine you had a choice between which of the following two gov-
ernment information gathering activities should receive Fourth 
Amendment protection: (1) government agents at the border squeeze 
the outside of people’s luggage without opening it; or (2) the govern-
ment launches a new satellite and surveillance camera system that can 
track and record all citizens’ activities in public throughout their life-
times. 
 The first activity is regulated by the Fourth Amendment.69 In 2000, 
in Bond v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a search in 
which a border patrol agent squeezed a bus passenger’s canvas bag and 
noticed a brick-like object that turned out to be methamphetamine.70 
The Court held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment be-
cause bus passengers do not expect their bags to be squeezed.71 
 The second activity, however, likely would not be regulated by the 
Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court has concluded that people 
lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in being observed in public. In 
1983, in United States v. Knotts, the Court held that people lack a reason-
able expectation of privacy when the government tracks their move-
ments outside their home.72 Similarly, in 1986, in California v. Ciraolo, 
                                                                                                                      
68 Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1892, 1899 
(1981). 
69 See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 336 (2000). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 338–39 (“A bus passenger clearly expects that his bag may be handled. He 
does not expect that other passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel the 
bag in an exploratory manner.”). 
72 460 U.S. 276, 282–85 (1983) (“Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the 
police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such en-
hancement as science and technology afforded them in this case.”). 
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the Court held that while in public, people lack a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy from visual observation from above.73 
 Massive and extensive government surveillance in public raises 
many concerns for freedom and democracy. Surveillance gives exten-
sive power to the watchers. The government could develop a repository 
of information about citizens and then use any instances of infraction 
as a pretext to attack people for things they say or for their political be-
liefs and activities. The government could also use any embarrassing 
information gleaned from surveillance to blackmail people. Govern-
ment officials could leak such information either through carelessness 
or to intentionally retaliate against a person or smear them. Surveil-
lance could chill speech, association, and other forms of dissent. 
 Even if such systematic government surveillance should be permit-
ted, it deserves at least some degree of oversight and regulation. But 
under current Fourth Amendment law, a little squeeze of a bag on a 
bus is fully regulated whereas systematic surveillance is not. These re-
sults are misguided and incoherent. The focus should not be on which 
government activities invade privacy; it should be on which government 
activities should be regulated. 
 I therefore join those who contend that the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy test should be abandoned. Among those who have made 
this contention, Professor William Stuntz argues that “[b]y focusing on 
privacy, Fourth Amendment law has largely abandoned the due process 
cases’ concern with coercion and violence.”74 Professor Raymond Ku 
contends that the Fourth Amendment should be understood as pro-
tecting against excessive government power and “preserving the peo-
ple’s authority over government.”75 Professor Jed Rubenfeld states that 
the “Fourth Amendment does not guarantee a right of privacy. It guar-
antees—if its actual words mean anything—a right of security.”76 
                                                                                                                      
73 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (“In an age where private and commercial flight in the 
public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana 
plants were constitutionally protected from being observed with the naked eye from an 
altitude of 1,000 feet.”). 
74 William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 Yale L.J. 393, 446 
(1995). 
75 Raymond Shi Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of 
Technological Surveillance, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 1325, 1326 (2002). 
76 Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 101, 104 (2008); see also Thomas 
K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 Wake 
Forest L. Rev. 307, 309 (1998) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s protections act negatively—
to exclude the government from unreasonably searching or seizing one’s person, house, 
papers, and effects. Without the ability to exclude, a person has no security.”). 
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 Scholars and jurists propose various candidates for the central 
thing the Fourth Amendment protects against—physical trespasses, in-
vasions of privacy, government power, excessive coercion, and general 
warrants.77 But the Fourth Amendment need not be boiled down to ad-
dressing a singular core problem. As Professor William Cuddihy has ar-
gued in his comprehensive history of the origins of the Fourth Amend-
ment, “[t]he history that preceded the Fourth Amendment . . . reveals a 
depth and complexity that transcend language. . . . The [A]mendment 
expressed not a single idea but a family of ideas whose identity and di-
mensions developed in historical context.”78 
 We should move past the endless attempts to find the core mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment or to identify a singular type of problem 
to trigger its protections. In the next Part, I propose a way forward. 
II. A Pragmatic Approach 
 Sizing up our current situation, the problem is that the Fourth 
Amendment has long been asked to do something it is not particularly 
well-designed to do—serve as a regulatory system for government in-
formation gathering in a world of pervasive data and burgeoning tech-
nology. We are using a one-sentence pronouncement of general prin-
ciples to regulate a wide array of government information gathering 
activities. The Constitution is not a statutory code. It often does not 
speak in great detail, especially in the Bill of Rights. Instead, it states 
broad principles and defines the limits and basic contours of govern-
ment power. It guides courts in evaluating which statutes are proper 
and which are invalid. 
 Currently, the Fourth Amendment remains the primary regime for 
regulating government information gathering. Certain forms of gov-
ernment information gathering (such as wiretapping and bugging, 
among other things) are regulated by statute, but most are regulated by 
the Fourth Amendment or nothing at all. 
                                                                                                                      
77 See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 
547, 551 (1999) (“[T]he historical concerns [underpinning the Fourth Amendment] were 
almost exclusively about the need to ban house searches under general warrants.”); Tracey 
Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 
9 (1994) (“Everyone, including [Professor Akhil Reed] Amar, agrees that the Framers 
opposed general warrants.”); Sundby, supra note 38, at 1777 (arguing the Fourth Amend-
ment involves the “‘trust’ between the government and the citizenry”). 
78 William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning 
770 (2009). 
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 A pragmatic approach to the Fourth Amendment recognizes this 
reality. We should sweep aside all the tests for Fourth Amendment cov-
erage, stop all the game-playing, and start focusing on the hard practi-
cal issue of how best to regulate government information gathering. 
The Fourth Amendment should cover government information gather-
ing comprehensively rather than haphazardly. A simple tenet of prag-
matism is that when there is a problem, one should try to understand it 
and then solve it.79 
 The Coverage Question should thus be an easy one. The Fourth 
Amendment should regulate government information gathering 
whenever it causes problems of reasonable significance. Government 
information gathering often poses significant problems affecting free-
dom and democracy. Government information gathering activities can 
invade privacy and inhibit freedom of speech and association. They 
make people more frightened to explore ideas. They allow the gov-
ernment to amass enormous quantities of citizens’ personal informa-
tion, which gives the government a vast amount of unchecked power 
and discretion. They can lead to abuses by law enforcement officials. 
The Fourth Amendment should provide coverage whenever any of 
these problems might occur—or when any other problem of reason-
able significance might occur. These problems are of a constitutional 
magnitude, for they are fundamental to the scope of the government’s 
power, the government’s relationship to the people, and the people’s 
ability to exercise autonomy, engage in free speech, communicate with 
others, associate in groups, participate in political activities, pursue self-
development, and formulate their own ideas, beliefs, and values. 
 The harder question is the Procedure Question: how are particular 
government information gathering activities to be regulated? Unfortu-
nately, the Coverage Question has often diverted attention away from 
tackling the more difficult Procedure Question. This is a cop out. 
 The way forward is to face the Procedure Question rather than try 
to avoid it. If the Fourth Amendment lacks a sufficiently broad array of 
                                                                                                                      
79 12 John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, in The Later Works 1, 110–13 ( Jo Ann 
Boydston ed., 1986). 
The point made can be most readily appreciated in connection with scientific 
reasoning. A hypothesis, once suggested and entertained, is developed in rela-
tion to other conceptual structures until it receives a form in which it can insti-
gate and direct an experiment that will disclose precisely those conditions 
which have the maximum possible force in determining whether the hypothesis 
should be accepted or rejected. 
Id. 
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regulatory options, then more should be crafted. Problematic govern-
ment information gathering activities should not be left completely un-
regulated because of some crabbed theory of the Fourth Amendment’s 
scope. 
A. Oversight and Regulation 
 We should face the reality that the Fourth Amendment has be-
come the central regulatory system for government information gath-
ering. In many ways, it is being asked to function like a statutory regime 
because there is a big void to fill. Although it works best as a guide for 
evaluating statutes, it must set forth rules when there are no statutes in 
place. Fourth Amendment coverage should not be carved up in arbi-
trary ways so as to avoid performing this role. 
 A pragmatic approach would focus on practical consequences and 
move past analytical games. We should begin by looking at the prob-
lems created by government information gathering activities. The 
scope of Fourth Amendment protection should be determined by ask-
ing whether a particular government information gathering activity 
causes problems of reasonable significance. 
 Under this approach, the Fourth Amendment would likely apply 
to a very broad range of government information gathering activities. 
The tougher issues emerge with the Procedure Question: if the Fourth 
Amendment applies, how should a particular government information 
gathering activity be regulated? The Fourth Amendment should not 
demand a one-size-fits-all rule requiring a warrant supported by prob-
able cause.80 Various forms of oversight and regulation can be costly 
and can make investigatory activities too inefficient to be worthwhile. 
We must assess the value of the information gathering activity and con-
sider it in light of the importance of ameliorating the problems it 
causes. The analysis should address questions such as: Is this informa-
tion gathering activity one that government should perform fre-
quently? Rarely? Early on in an investigation? Only as a last resort? In 
particular cases involving only those suspected of crimes? En masse to 
the entire population? 
                                                                                                                      
80 Fabio Arcila, The Death of Suspicion, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1275, 1341 (2010) (“A 
large problem with current Fourth Amendment law is that it veers wildly between two oppos-
ing poles—the strict application of the presumptive warrant or suspicion requirements on 
one hand, and effectively unconstrained balancing through a totality-of-the-circumstances 
approach in the other.”). 
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 Even the exclusionary rule is not sacrosanct under such an ap-
proach. The approach to what enforcement mechanism should be re-
quired for Fourth Amendment violations should be determined by fo-
cusing on the practical consequences. 
 In most cases, a particular form of oversight and regulation can be 
devised that will allow the government to engage in information gath-
ering but will minimize many problems created by such gathering. 
Consider, for example, the collection of genetic information. Suppose 
the government wants to obtain a person’s DNA. The police follow the 
person around, waiting for her to discard an item from which they can 
obtain her genetic information. Under current doctrine, will the 
Fourth Amendment provide protection in this instance? The answer is 
likely no.81 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet addressed the 
issue, courts have thus far concluded that people lack a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in such situations, relying primarily on the 1988 
Supreme Court case of California v. Greenwood and analogizing aban-
doned objects containing DNA to abandoned trash.82 In 2006, in Com-
monwealth v. Ewing, the Massachusetts Appeals Court concluded that a 
person lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in a discarded ciga-
rette, which was subsequently used to obtain his DNA, because he “vol-
untarily abandoned [the cigarette] as trash.”83 Likewise, in 2007, in State 
v. Athan, the Washington Supreme Court considered a situation in 
which the police had tricked a defendant by pretending to be attorneys 
involved in a class action and asking whether the defendant wanted to 
be included in the class.84 The defendant returned a reply envelope, 
and the police obtained his DNA from the saliva he used to seal it.85 
The Washington Supreme Court held that “[p]olice may surreptitiously 
follow a suspect to collect DNA, fingerprints, footprints, or other possi-
bly incriminating evidence, without violating that suspect’s privacy.”86 
 The reasonable expectation of privacy test bogs us down in an ana-
lytical game, but the crucial questions are lost in the shuffle. Should the 
government be able to gather everyone’s genetic information without 
any oversight? Should it be able to collect samples without any suspi-
                                                                                                                      
81 See Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic Pri-
vacy, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 857, 862 (2006) (“In cases involving ‘abandoned DNA,’ however, the 
police have been able to retrieve the most detailed genetic information, without being sub-
ject to the criminal procedure rules that normally apply to searches and seizures.”). 
82 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 50 (1988). 
83 854 N.E.2d 993, 1001 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006). 
84 158 P.3d 27, 31 (Wash. 2007). 
85 Id. at 32. 
86 Id. at 37. 
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cion at all? Should it be able to use the samples however it desires and 
keep them for as long as it wants? Should it be able to do this systemati-
cally for millions of people without any limitation? To what degree 
should the government be able to use trickery and deception in order 
to obtain DNA information? 
 Genetic information can reveal quite a lot about a person’s medi-
cal past and future, as well as information about her family members.87 
Some oversight and limitation of the collection and use of this informa-
tion might prevent abuses and ensure that DNA is collected only to in-
vestigate people suspected of criminal activity. Making the government 
seek judicial authorization—even a warrant supported by probable 
cause—does not prevent the police from obtaining DNA through aban-
doned items. 
 Another example is the application of the third party doctrine be-
yond the context of phone and bank records. In what is known as 
“cloud computing,” users access software via the Internet and, in some 
cases, store their documents, videos, and photos remotely. Google 
Docs, for example, allows people to upload word processing docu-
ments, spreadsheets, and other files to Google’s servers, a function that 
is useful for backing up data or editing documents jointly with others. 
Because these documents are no longer stored on people’s home com-
puters but with a third party, they might fall outside of Fourth Amend-
ment protection. Some contend that the third party doctrine applies 
only to a limited class of data, not to the content of all documents and 
communications.88 Others view the doctrine more broadly, as applying 
to all personal information possessed by third parties.89 
                                                                                                                      
87 See, e.g., Michelle Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement’s Greatest Surveillance 
Tool?, 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. 767, 782 (1999) (noting that a DNA profile “not only re-
veal[s] extensive genetic information about the individual whose ‘genetic fingerprint’ is 
on file, but also about his or her close relatives”); Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from 
Property: Toward a Deeper Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 737, 739 
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88 See Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical 
Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1557, 1581 
(2004) (noting that Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) distinguished Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) based on “the limited information that can be gleaned from a 
phone number, contrasting it with what may be revealed from a telephone conversation”). 
89 See Computer Crime & Intellectual Prop. Section Criminal Div., Dep't of Jus-
tice, Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in 
Criminal Investigations 6–10 (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cyber 
crime/ssmanual/ssmanual2009.pdf. 
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 The debate is difficult to resolve because the Supreme Court’s deci-
sions are incoherent.90 In 1979, in Smith v. Maryland, the Court set forth 
two rationales: (1) the information was merely phone numbers and did 
not involve “the contents of communications,” and (2) people “know 
that they must convey numerical information to the phone company,” 
and thus they cannot “harbor any general expectation that the numbers 
they dial will remain secret.”91 Does this mean that the third party doc-
trine only applies when the information is not as sensitive as the content 
of communications? Or does it apply whenever records are in the hands 
of third parties? United States v. Miller, decided by the Court in 1976, a 
few years before Smith, applied the third party doctrine to bank records 
and suggested a broader interpretation of the third party doctrine.92 But 
would the third party doctrine apply to medical records? After all, peo-
ple expose their medical conditions to their doctors. Would the Su-
preme Court really hold that people lack an expectation of privacy in 
their medical data because they convey that information to their physi-
cians? This result would strike many as absurd. 
 This debate can be sidestepped entirely with the pragmatic ap-
proach I am proposing. Under such an approach, there is a strong ar-
gument that government access to records held by third parties should 
be subject to oversight and regulation. It is increasingly the case that 
much of what we do, buy, and read generates records maintained by 
third parties. Regulation and oversight should not turn on the happen-
stance of where such records are located, and changing technology that 
increasingly locates them outside people’s homes should not suddenly 
cause them to drop out of the regulatory regime. 
 We should not be debating whether people expect privacy in re-
cords held by third parties. Such a debate misses the more fundamental 
questions: Should government gathering of records held by third par-
ties be regulated and subjected to oversight? If so, what kind of regula-
tion and oversight would best balance law enforcement goals with pro-
tection against harm? 
 Interestingly, Professor Orin Kerr, who has provided the most ro-
bust defense of the third party doctrine, focuses his arguments on prac-
tical considerations about how the application of the Fourth Amend-
ment will affect law enforcement investigations—not on the fact that 
                                                                                                                      
90 See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 741; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). 
91 See 442 U.S. at 741, 743 (italics omitted); supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
92 Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (“All of the documents obtained, including financial state-
ments and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and 
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”). 
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people lack privacy in their records.93 Kerr points to statutory and 
other regulations for records held by third parties that he believes pro-
vide a better system of regulation, “a middle ground not possible under 
the Fourth Amendment.”94 
 Kerr finds it best to place records held by third parties outside of 
the Fourth Amendment’s scope because he finds the Amendment’s 
regulatory rules to be deficient.95 But there are many types of records 
maintained by third parties that are not protected at all by statute or by 
any of the alternative regulatory mechanisms he discusses.96 
 Instead of excluding something from Fourth Amendment cover-
age just because of problems with Fourth Amendment rules, the solu-
tion is to improve those rules rather than provide no protection. Gov-
ernment access to records held by third parties should be covered by 
the Fourth Amendment. If the legislature seeks to regulate these re-
cords by statute, the courts should evaluate the efficacy of that statute 
in terms of how well it balances the problems and benefits of govern-
ment access. By placing such activities outside the Fourth Amendment’s 
coverage, the Supreme Court has adopted the rather ludicrous position 
that people lack privacy in records held by third parties. Why keep play-
ing this game? Why not just face the hard issues and figure out how best 
to regulate government access to records in the hands of third parties? 
This debate should sound not in privacy, but in the practical conse-
quences—the benefits and costs of regulation and oversight. This is the 
debate we should be having over the Fourth Amendment, not a debate 
about its applicability. 
B. A Response to Potential Objections 
 There are several potential objections to the pragmatic approach I 
am proposing. First, in the “inconsistency objection,” one might con-
tend that my approach would lead to too much inconsistency in the 
law. Second, in the “textualist objection,” one might contend that the 
                                                                                                                      
93 See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 561, 597 
(2009). 
94 See id. 
95 See id. (“In many (but not all) of these cases, the statutory privacy laws provide less 
protection than would the analogous Fourth Amendment standard of a probable cause 
warrant. But that is a good thing rather than a bad one. . . . These intermediate standards 
deter wrongful abuse while permitting legitimate investigations.”). 
96 See Solove, The Digital Person, supra note 4, at 202–09. For example, “[r]ecords 
held by bookstores, department stores, restaurants, clubs, gyms, employers, and other 
companies are not protected [by statute from government access].” Id. at 208. 
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pragmatic approach is too indeterminate because it is not sufficiently 
tethered to the actual text of the Fourth Amendment. Third, in the 
“usurpation objection,” one might argue that the pragmatic approach 
encroaches too much upon the province of the legislature. 
1. The Inconsistency Objection 
 Professor Kerr argues that focusing on policy would be unwork-
able because “lower courts cannot administer it consistently.”97 He 
notes that the Supreme Court only resolves a fraction of the Fourth 
Amendment cases decided per year: “[T]he Supreme Court’s decisions 
cover only a tiny sliver of fact patterns common in police investiga-
tions.”98 He believes that looking directly at policy is too fact-specific 
because “it asks courts to assess whether a particular set of practices re-
quire regulation, inviting a balancing of interests over the range of 
those facts that fall within the defined practice.”99 This leads to instabil-
ity in the law.100 
 Kerr identifies bona fide problems, but they are problems endemic 
to many areas of law. Indeed, the reasonable expectation of privacy test 
also leads to many ambiguities. As I discussed earlier, there are many 
open questions with regard to the scope of the third party doctrine. 
Courts will always struggle when determining what situations are analo-
gous to previous decisions. 
 Clear and consistent rules could readily be established by looking 
to policy. Moreover, my approach would determine the applicability of 
the Fourth Amendment not based on balancing, but based on whether 
there are problems of reasonable significance caused by government 
information gathering. If there is a problem, then the Fourth Amend-
ment would regulate. Courts would determine what degree of oversight 
and regulation is best suited to ameliorate the problem. My approach 
differs from the reasonable expectation of privacy test in that it recog-
nizes all of the problems caused by government information gathering, 
not just privacy problems. 
 For the initial Coverage Question, my approach would provide 
much clearer results than the reasonable expectation of privacy test. 
Most government information gathering activities would be covered. 
For the Procedure Question, courts would, over time, develop a set of 
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99 Id. at 539–40. 
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principles to evaluate legislation as well as specific rules in the absence 
of legislation. There is no reason why this jurisprudence cannot be 
clear and coherent. 
2. The Textualist Objection 
 The principal contention under the textualist objection is that the 
pragmatic approach threatens to turn the Fourth Amendment into a 
way for courts to impose their own normative aims on society. 
 But this is what the Fourth Amendment has already become. Very 
little of modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relates to the 
Amendment’s text. The reasonable expectation of privacy test itself 
does not emerge from the text. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment does 
not even include the word “privacy.” The doctrine has evolved so far 
beyond the text of the Fourth Amendment—and beyond the text of 
most of the Constitution—that text should not be determinative. 
 Moreover, the Fourth Amendment’s text is quite broad, speaking 
of “unreasonable searches,” and thus need not be limited to one par-
ticular kind of problem. Just as a search can be unreasonable because it 
violates privacy, it can be unreasonable because it causes other kinds of 
problems. The Amendment can be read as a broad pronouncement 
that whenever the government gathers information, it must do so in a 
way that minimizes potential problems. It also can be read to ensure 
that the benefits of government information gathering outweigh what-
ever problems cannot be eliminated. These requirements—that prob-
lems caused by searches be minimized with oversight and regulation 
and that the benefits of searches outweigh the costs—are common 
sense, and they should constitute the heart of reasonableness under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
3. The Usurpation Objection 
 The usurpation objection demands a significantly more detailed 
response. According to this argument, the pragmatic approach would 
usurp the function of the legislative branch. The judicial branch would 
effectively get more leeway to craft whatever system of regulation it 
wants.101 Even beyond new technologies, some might argue that the 
                                                                                                                      
101 See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and 
the Case for Caution, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801, 858 (2004). As Professor Kerr argues, “[c]ourts 
tend to be poorly suited to generate effective rules regulating criminal investigations in-
volving new technologies. In contrast, legislatures possess a significant institutional advan-
tage in this area over courts.” Id. 
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rules that govern how the government should use its powers of infor-
mation gathering should be determined by democratically elected leg-
islatures, not crafted by judges, who are detached from the will of the 
people and lack the expertise of law enforcement officials. 
 Although this objection has merit, the reality is that only in limited 
circumstances have legislatures been active in crafting rules to regulate 
government information gathering.102 When the Fourth Amendment 
was initially applied to government information gathering activities, 
there was little statutory law to regulate them. Moreover, the govern-
ment’s information gathering activities represent one of the most po-
tent forms of government power—and they can affect our freedom and 
democracy in profound ways. Because these issues are so fundamental 
to the basic structure of our society, they are justifiably regulated by the 
Constitution. 
 Nevertheless, the Constitution generally speaks in broad pro-
nouncements of principle; it lacks the specificity and detail of statutes. 
Because the Fourth Amendment generally regulates with warrants sup-
ported by probable cause and enforced by the exclusionary rule, some 
might argue that it lacks the nimbleness and flexibility to regulate all of 
the varied activities of government information gathering. 
 The Fourth Amendment need not be interpreted rigidly to require 
a one-size-fits-all rule for all forms of government information gathering. 
Although the Fourth Amendment generally requires warrants supported 
by probable cause, the Supreme Court has crafted numerous exceptions 
to promote greater flexibility. There are exceptions for exigent circum-
stances,103 for temporary stops and frisks of suspicious individuals,104 and 
                                                                                                                      
102 See Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call 
for Judicial Deference, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 747, 768–72 (2005). 
Federal legislation is not easy to pass, and it usually takes a dramatic event to 
spark interest in creating or updating a law. Congress often only gets involved 
when there is a major uproar or problem, and unless there is a strong impe-
tus, little new lawmaking occurs. . . . As a result, issues are likely to be ad-
dressed with more frequency in the courts than in Congress. 
Id. at 771. 
103 See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990) (holding that the Fourth Amend-
ment is not violated when police officers “enter [a home] without a warrant because they 
reasonably (though erroneously) believe that they are in pursuit of a violent felon who is 
about to escape”). 
104 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968). 
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasona-
bly to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot 
and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently 
 
2010] Fourth Amendment Pragmatism 1537 
for checkpoints,105 among many others. The Fourth Amendment has 
already been interpreted to have a fair degree of flexibility, and there is 
no reason why it cannot be interpreted to be even more flexible if need 
be. 
 It is true, however, that courts crafting rules under the Fourth 
Amendment will likely not have the same range in palate as a legisla-
ture would have. Nothing in my approach prevents a legislature from 
crafting a rule that diverges from any rule a court might create—so 
long as that rule satisfies the minimum requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 A related point under the usurpation argument is that a very 
broad Fourth Amendment scope would deter legislatures from enact-
ing laws to regulate law enforcement. If the Fourth Amendment allows 
courts to lord over criminal procedure, then legislatures might feel they 
have hardly any room to create their own rules. 
 This concern would be significant if courts were to impose their 
own set of rules under the Fourth Amendment and refuse to accept 
any alternative rules that legislatures might pass. The Fourth Amend-
ment states only basic principles. Specific rules would come from legis-
latures, and they would be reviewed by the courts to ensure they satis-
fied the basic principles of the Fourth Amendment. Only in the 
absence of legislative rules should courts create their own specific rules. 
Indeed, as a general rule, whenever there is a legislative rule governing 
a particular government information gathering activity, courts should 
merely evaluate it as to whether it meets the basic principles of the 
Fourth Amendment, not as to whether it is the ideal policy choice. 
 The pragmatic approach I am proposing expands the scope of 
Fourth Amendment coverage, but there is still sufficient space for legis-
latures to create rules to regulate government information gathering. 
                                                                                                                      
dangerous . . . he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the 
area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such per-
sons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. 
Id. at 30. 
105 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). 
[T]he balance of the State’s interest in preventing drunken driving, the ex-
tent to which this system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and 
the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped, 
weighs in favor of the state program. We therefore hold that it is consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment. 
Id. 
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Conclusion 
 Fourth Amendment law is in a malaise. It is the primary body of 
regulation for government information gathering, yet it applies in a 
patchwork fashion. The problems stem from the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy test, which focuses the debate over the scope of Fourth 
Amendment protection on the wrong issue—whether privacy is in-
vaded. Courts get bogged down in attempting to elucidate the meaning 
of “privacy” and fail to look at the full range of problems caused by 
government information gathering. It is time to move past the reason-
able expectation of privacy test and adopt a more pragmatic approach 
to the Fourth Amendment. 
